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Abstract—Almost every company needs to process invoices to
either claim money from their customers or to pay for products
or services. Although companies are allowed to electronically
process their invoices, most of them still rely on the paper-based
invoice process. Within this paper we built upon existing work
to develop a methodology for defining a reference model for
the electronic invoice based on security patterns. This paper
identifies threats of the e-invoice process in order to create a
context for the security problem, which allows us to refine our
methodology.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent study [1] of electronic invoices indicates a
potential for savings up to 70 percent compared to paper-
based invoices. Yet, implementing a valid and particularly
secure electronic invoice process is a complex task and
thus the majority of companies and especially small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) still rely on paper-based
invoice processes. In earlier work [2] we have identified the
main obstacles that hamper the comprehensive adoption of
e-invoices.
To address this problem it is necessary to develop a ref-
erence model for the electronic invoice process. A reference
model for the electronic invoice should provide guidance
for implementing valid e-invoice solutions. Up to now and
to the best of our knowledge no such reference model exists.
In order to arrive at a reference model our approach aims
to use security patterns, as they embody expert knowledge
to address the security related aspects of such a reference
model. The goal is to find a consistent set of security
patterns, known as a pattern system which help to create
a secure model for e-invoices.
In [2] we have proposed a methodology to discover a
set of known patterns and thereby support the development
of a reference model for the electronic invoice process. In
this paper we try now to improve our methodology. The
refinement consists of two parts. First, the security aspects of
the electronic invoice process are approached from the view
of an attacker. Therefore, each activity is analyzed to find
security vulnerabilities which might be exploited. Second,
the threat model is used to refine our work towards an
electronic invoice reference model. In the following we use
the definitions of threat and misuse activity interchangeably.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section II we discuss related work. A detailed threat analysis
for the electronic invoice process is presented in section
III. Within section IV we introduce the concept of context
information, that describes the environment of the security
problem. Section V presents our approach to refine our
existing e-invoice classification. Section VI concludes the
paper with an outlook on future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Security patterns were first introduced by Yoder et al. [3].
However up to now only few papers exist that consider them
for improving the electronic invoice process exist ([4][2]).
Fernandez et al. proposed a semantic analysis pattern to
capture the fundamental aspects of invoice processing. Sev-
eral approaches exist for threat-modelling in order to elicit,
classify and stop threats (for example [5][6]). The contents
of invoices can be found in [7], [8], and [9]. Neither of them
describes security aspects.
III. E-INVOICE THREAT IDENTIFICATION
Creating a reference model for the electronic invoice
requires analyzing the problem domain from different per-
spectives. Within our previous work we took on the white-
hat role, i.e. we approached the problem by regarding the
affected security objectives. However, such a single-view
based model is not sufficient as it leaves out the view of
an attacker. Therefore, in this paper we take the position of
an attacker trying to circumvent the security mechanisms.
Figure 1. Extended activity diagram for the partitioned electronic invoice process
In order to find all threats a systematic approach is nec-
essary. We apply the misuse activities approach proposed
in [10] which uses UML activity diagrams to represent the
data and control flow. The activity diagrams are extended
with further elements which allow for the representation of
misuse activities.
To ease the identification of threats for the electronic
invoice process we split the process into three parts:
• Creation: Refers to the process of creating a valid
e-invoice. This includes measures to ensure a secure,
auditable creation process as well as the protection of
the integrity of an e-invoice.
• Exchange: Refers to the process of sending, transmit-
ting and receiving e-invoices.
• Storage: Refers to the process of persistently storing
an e-invoice and all attachments that are required to
verify the integrity of an e-invoice.
Partitioning the electronic invoice into process steps al-
lows for a detailed investigation of each flow of activities
in order to discover all possible ways to subvert an activity.
The misuse activities in Figure 1 are denoted by dashed
rounded rectangles while dashed connecting lines represent
misuse flows that indicate how the flow of control may be
modified. Figure 1 shows three UML activity diagrams, each
for one part of the e-invoice process steps. Furthermore for
each control and data flow, the possible misuse activities
are depicted illustrating unambiguously the threats for the
specific activity.
Focusing on the creation process, adding items to the
electronic invoice template may be subverted by an attacker
changing the total sum of the invoice the customer has to pay
and thus compromising the integrity of the invoice. Further-
more, an attacker that is able to modify the creation process
can additionally alter the recipient, which compromises both
the confidentiality and the integrity of the invoice. In order
to detect such modifications, Fernandez et al. [4] propose
to add an invoice validation activity before the invoice is
finalized. However if the attacker is an insider he might be
able to fake or even circumvent this validation process, but
this is out of scope of our attacker model.
The threat analysis is also performed for the transmission
process. It reveals several activities within the control and
data flow that are vulnerable. First, the attacker might be
able to change the address of the invoice recipient. If,
for instance, the invoice is sent by e-mail, the attacker
might be able to alter the e-mail address of the recipient
if no security mechanisms are in place. Furthermore the
transmission itself is vulnerable to several attacks, since it
is usually carried out using some insecure channel like the
internet. An attacker can eavesdrop the communication by
performing a man-in-the-middle attack, which allows him
to obtain knowledge of the content of the invoice and thus
violate confidentiality. With no protection mechanisms in
place, an attacker can furthermore modify the content of the
invoice, which corrupts the invoice’s integrity. Additionally,
the invoice might be intercepted and a fake invoice is sent
to the recipient.
The storage part is the third part of the partitioned elec-
tronic invoice process and its security is of major importance
mostly due to legal requirements. There are three main
misuse activities an attacker can perform. First, the invoice
can be modified and thus the integrity of the invoice is
corrupted which endangers the VAT (value-added tax) refund
for this invoice. The second threat concerns confidentiality.
An attacker may be able to obtain the content of the invoice
which may lead to a competitive disadvantage. Furthermore
the invoice may be deleted and is therefore no longer
available which also endangers the VAT refund.
IV. THREAT CONTEXT DEFINITION
Once the threats for all parts of the electronic invoice
process are discovered, policies must be defined to stop
those threats [1]. Having both the identified threats and the
corresponding policies, this allows to define the context of
the security problem. While the threats can be related to the
problem section of a security pattern the policies provide
a solution. Thus the context of a security problem can be
denoted as
< context >= (< threat >,< policy >) (1)
The context of a security pattern is defined as the environ-
ment where the pattern can be applied. Context information
can be extracted from both the problem and the solution of
a security pattern. Thus we define the context of a security
pattern as
< context >= (< problem >,< solution >) (2)
Figure 2. Context definition
Figure 2 depicts the relation between a security problem,
described by threats and policies and security patterns,
represented by the problem and the solution section. Both
concepts create an identical context.
V. REFERENCE MODEL REFINEMENT
In our previous work [2], we analyzed the security aspects
of the electronic invoice process, focusing on the affected
security objectives. There we proposed an approach to relate
security objectives to security patterns, leading to a set of
patterns that can be used to realize a solution for the security
problem. However, using security objectives as the only
classification criterion leads to a large set of possible security
patterns. In order to refine this set of security patterns, we
consider the threats for the electronic invoice, i.e. taking
the view of an attacker. We have identified the important
threats for the electronic invoice process and defined policies
to prevent possible attacks. This information enables us to
create a context for each security problem.
In the following we use this context information to refine
our existing set of security patterns for the electronic invoice.
Figure 3 (a) shows an extract of our classification scheme,
presented in [2]. Therein security objectives are used to
map appropriate security patterns to the e-invoice processes.
It can be seen, that for a single security objective and a
single part of the e-invoice process there are several security
patterns, that might be helpful to fulfill the objective. How-
ever some patterns a provide similar solution and in other
situations, a combination of several patterns is required.
Furthermore some patterns admittedly fulfill the security
objective but the context is different and thus the patterns
are not applicable for the electronic invoice.
In order to refine the selection of security patterns and thus
improving the development of a reference model we conduct
a threat analysis of the e-invoice process. The approach ist
depicted in Figure 3 (b).
Figure 3. Refinement
First, for each threat an appropriate policy must be defined
that stops the threat. The combination of a threat T1 and a
policy P1 defines a context C1. For instance, in order to stop
the threat T6: Eavesdrop transmission an appropriate policy
might state that ...every communication must be encrypted
using a secure algorithm. Since threats can be related to
the problem section and policies to the solution section of
security patterns it is possible to determine a context for
each security pattern. Thus in order to refine the selection
of security patterns shown in Figure 3 (a), the context C is
determined for each security pattern of the pattern catalogue.
For example, the security pattern Secure Communication
[11] has the context C5 which is identical with the context
of the threat/policy combination T5/P5 derived from the
threat analysis. Thus the pattern is likely to be appropriate
to solve the security problem described by threat T5.
The refinement step aims to improve the classification
scheme developed in [2]. This requires to analyse the set
of security patterns for each part of the the e-invoice
process. This step is depicted in Figure 3 (b). Due to
space constraints only the refinement of the set of security
patterns for the transmission process concering the security
objective confidentiality is shown. The result of the selection
step executed in [2] shows a set of three security patterns.
While all security patterns address the security objective
confidentiality, the context of two patterns is not suitable.
The Account category pattern [12] is focused on the length of
passwords and the Encrypted storage pattern [13] provides
a solution to store confidential information on a storage
medium. Thus those two security patterns can be removed
from the set leaving the pattern Secure Communication. As
described in the previous paragraph, the context of Secure
Communication is suitable to stop threat T5.
The refinement step is repeated for every field of the
classification matrix, i.e. for every set of patterns. As a result,
the number of security patterns that are suitable for solving
the security challenges of the electronic invoice process is
reduced. Using the refined classification scheme shown in 3
(b) the complexity for deriving a pattern system is reduced,
which is due to future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have identified the threats of the elec-
tronic invoice process by extending the UML activity dia-
gram with misuse activities. We use the threats to introduce
the concept of the context of a security problem and show
how to define the context for security patterns. The context
information enables us to refine our classification scheme
for the electronic invoice developed in [2] and thus improve
our methodology to develop a reference model.
However the approach relies on an existing catalogue of
security patterns that is enriched with context information,
which must be generated manually. Therefore our future
work includes the analysis of methods to automatically
derive the context information of our security pattern cat-
alogue. Furthermore it is required to derive a pattern system
from our classification scheme depicted in Figure 3 in order
to derive a reference model for the security related aspects
of the electronic invoice process.
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